



UNITED STATES  
ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545

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Joe Deal  
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APR 20 1977

referred  
for your file  
for discussion

11/5/77

Hal Hollister, Acting Director  
Division of Safety, Standards,  
and Compliance

JLL'S MEMORANDUM OF APRIL 21, 1977, ON THE AES'S MANAGEMENT POSITION  
IN THE PACIFIC

I think it will take several memoranda to present our case. However,  
I believe the following answers the specific question about "bad  
blood" and SSC role.

We need detailed discussion with BER on the elements of the Radio-  
logical Safety Program for the Marshall Islands as well as their  
thoughts on how this fits into the single manager concept.

The SSC memorandum was not intended to contain any hidden traps.  
In fact, it was intended to flag problem areas that the single  
manager concept was not able to address. The action memorandum was  
developed in BER, no draft was circulated for review, and there was  
little or no input from SSC even though the recommended action is  
of significant importance to this Division.

There is no bad blood in the system. However, there are serious  
differences of opinion that we are working to resolve. Most of  
these do involve our relationship with NVO, specifically with  
R. Ray. For example:

1. We average two or three calls per month from DNA HQ about  
interface problems between their Field Command at Albuquerque  
and NVO. Thursday we met with General Shedd, Deputy Director,  
DNA, to try to resolve a question of how ERDA will provide to  
DNA "certification" that cleanup has been completed. We have  
sent some suggested words to NVO that have staff agreement;  
however, NVO staff has to check them with R. Ray, who was out  
of town.
2. When the Interior Subcommittee of the House Appropriations  
Committee was considering DOI's supplemental budget, which  
contained the request for money reimbursement to DOD for  
logistic support of ERDA's aerial radiological survey of the  
thirteen atolls in the Pacific and rehabilitation money for

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Enewetak, DOI asked us to accompany them to the hearings to answer questions about the survey itself. Instead of questioning the survey, the Committee asked detailed questions about the safety and viability of the use of CACTUS crater for disposing of radioactive scrap and plutonium contaminated soil. It was clear that if any doubts were left in the Committee's mind about safety for this means of waste disposal, the rehabilitation project would be killed. During the period while we were answering questions, etc., we received an urgent request from NVO staff, acting on direction from R. Ray, who was still in the Pacific, to arrange an early meeting with HQ DNA, DOI, EPA, and ERDA to reopen the entire question of crater burial. We finally convinced NVO that no matter how meritorious the arguments against crater burial, this was not the time to reopen the matter unless we were prepared for the Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to kill action on the resettlement money.

3. Before the cleanup even begins, 50 people have been resettled on Japtan Island at Enewetak. We opposed NVO on this and lost (see enclosed letter, JLL to Carpenter). However, as a matter of prudence, the AEC Task Group had recommended certain measures be taken to monitor people before they returned to Enewetak. When the 50 people were returned, DNA HQ called to remind us about our recommendation on monitoring and asked about the plans to implement these recommendations. Subsequent conversations with NVO have indicated a reluctance to proceed until the people understand why these measurements need to be taken. DOI HQ and Mr. Mitchell have told us that they will deal with this matter, and that we should proceed with our planning of the monitoring program. In fact, Mr. Mitchell feels this is so important that he agreed to personally talk with the people about this. The matter is still under discussion. Our concern is that we act on a timely basis rather than waiting for many months before doing this baseline monitoring. Otherwise we feel ERDA is vulnerable to criticism for not taking a precaution we ourselves have recommended.

We are not trying to orchestrate activities in the Pacific from Washington. In fact, we have done precisely the opposite; see enclosed memorandum assigning the responsibilities for radiological support of Enewetak cleanup to NVO. What we are trying to do is to sort out the proper role of the Headquarters versus the field and to fulfill the Headquarters' function. Specifically, in Example 1, above, we are providing an interface with DNA HQ to resolve problems affecting the Enewetak cleanup. In Example 2, there was an urgent need, on short notice, to provide backup testimony twice to the

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Interior Subcommittee on Appropriations and once to the Senate Appropriations Committee on Enewetak and on the forthcoming radiological survey.

A third area where we are providing a Headquarters' function is in continued discussions with other Federal agencies, including OMB, DST, DOD, and the Department of Justice on the aerial radiological survey of the thirteen Pacific atolls. There is a great deal of discussion and planning needed before this program is ready for implementation. The Bill containing the money for logistic support has gone through the House and Senate and may go to the President within the next few weeks.


This latter item is another where there are differing opinions that we are trying to resolve with NVO. The field wants a letter similar to the one assigning them responsibility for support of radiological cleanup at Enewetak. We suggested that R. Ray or his designee come in this past week to discuss the matter with us and with the DOD. His schedule was such that this cannot be accomplished until sometime later in May. Furthermore, he is suggesting delays in the thirteen atoll survey until after the first of the calendar year largely because NVO's commitment to support cleanup of Enewetak is beginning to tax their resources. A great deal of high-level push including overtures to OMB were made expressing the need and urgency of this survey. OMB recognized this and chose to use a DOI 1977 supplemental as the vehicle for obtaining funding rather than wait for the DOI FY 1978 Appropriation; therefore, we believe a delay in supplementing this program is unacceptable. Furthermore, the contractors involved in the thirteen atoll technical program are not heavily involved in Enewetak cleanup. We have started exploring resources that are available to us in conversations with BER, EG&G, HASL, LLL, BNL, University of Washington, and NVO on the planning of the technical content of the survey. Once this planning has begun, it will have to be coordinated with the lawyers for the Bikini people because conduct of this survey is one condition for dropping the pending lawsuit against the U. S. Government.

Another reason for not delaying this program is that the Department of Justice wants to settle this suit as soon as possible. Since DOD is committed to provide logistic support for the survey and most of the ERDA contractors are not involved in cleanup, we think NVO's involvement should be minimal and not to be the cause for delaying this operation.

  
L. Joe Deal  
Assistant Director for  
Health Protection, SSC

Enclosures:

1. 7/18/74 memo
2. 10/9/75 memo



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Hal Hollister, SSC Actg Dir

I don't think I am seeing the whole (or is it hole) card here in this memo.

I sense and I do believe correctly that there is some bad blood somewhere in the system that leads to a memo such as this one.


Are Deal and Ray having problems?  
How can we orchestrate the whole Bikini etc matter from Washington? Why should we? NV00 has been handling things for us for a long time out there with not too much trouble once we dedicated some efforts here and at NV00 to seeing that we were going to work together as opposed to apart.

There is nothing in the memo which convinces me that the move to consolidate an AES (not Ber, not SSC, not ECT, etc) in Hawaii who would look after the interests of the whole organization isn't a good thing to do.

Please rethink your positions and also discuss with the BER people and try to come to some meaningful compromise about our problems. With some 40 or so contractors working the problem area, with major contractors and major DOD interactions we can't hope to handle the matter from Headquarters - no more than Johnson could run Vietnam from the Whitehouse.

Please work this problem and return with a view or views.

I'd think about 1 week was long enough to deal with the issue.

  
J. Liverman, AES 4/21/77



HM 12/2/80